David Hanson: My hon. Friend raises an important issue. We have tried to do several things. We have established and increased the co-ownership scheme to ensure that we provide shared ownership potential in housing. I recently amended the threshold for co-ownership so that it can increase with house price inflation, particularly in hot spots such as Belfast and the north-west of the Province We have also increased the property threshold for stamp duty to £125,000, so that first-time buyers do not need to make a major up-front financial contribution and can instead put that money towards their capital costs and mortgage payments. It is an important issue, and there is more that we can do. When the report is published shortly, I am hopeful that it will include positive suggestions for action.

David Hanson: I share the hon. Gentleman's aspirations, and I hope that an incoming Administration—a devolved Administration—can deal with those issues in detail. I have made it clear that I want the provision of Government-owned land for housing purposes to be maximised so that we can provide affordable housing through private sector development and, indeed, social housing. I have undertaken a trawl of Government Departments with surplus land, and, through the Semple report, we will try to ensure that we examine that potential in detail so that we maximise the benefits by reducing the cost of new build by using any surplus Government-owned land as, indeed, is done in terms of land surplus to my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister and his Department and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and her Department.

David Hanson: I welcome my hon. Friend's comments. He will know that the Semple report, which will shortly be published in full, addresses many of those issues in its draft form. I hope that the matters that my hon. Friend raises will form part of the challenges facing the incoming Administration on 26 March, because there is much that can be done in relation to planning matters, land use, social housing build and improving co-ownership. I have an agenda for that, but it is the responsibility of the new Administration to take that forward and to respond positively to Sir John Semple's recommendations. I hope my hon. Friend and his colleagues in the Social Democratic and Labour party will play a significant role in taking forward that agenda.

Andrew MacKinlay: The next time a Northern Ireland Minister is in Dublin, will he or she visit the Northern Ireland Tourist Board in Nassau street, opposite Trinity? It is unattractive, unappealing and lacking in marketing skills for the beautiful Northern Ireland that hon. Members have described. It is important that such a visit is made in order that we can attract people interlining to the island of Ireland through Dublin to come to the North, and more importantly, to attract citizens of Dublin and elsewhere in the Republic to come to the North. I have seen more appealing funeral homes than that office in Nassau street.

Peter Hain: I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, it was notable that, instead of the old issues dominating the election, water charges, the rating system and academic selection were the key issues on the doorstep and at the ballot box. The message from the people is that they want locally elected politicians to take those decisions, and the Government will assist in providing an environment for that to occur. It is important that the will of the people is respected, and that the Assembly is up and functioning on 26 March.

Menzies Campbell: I join the Prime Minister in his expressions of sympathy and condolence.
	I cannot help remembering that the last time that the right hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) and the Prime Minister voted together in the same Lobby on an issue of national interest was on Iraq, and that has not proved to be a comforting precedent. Does the Prime Minister accept that the most immediate nuclear threat is from other countries acquiring nuclear weapons? What then will be the role played by his Government at the nuclear non-proliferation review conference in 2010?

Tony Blair: We will continue to play a positive role on this issue. However, I must say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that there is absolutely no evidence whatever that if Britain now renounced its independent nuclear deterrent that would improve the prospect of getting multilateral disarmament. On the contrary, I think that the reverse is the case. I must also say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that although of course I understand why he wants to put off this decision—I understand that that is his position—the fact is that the 17-year programme is what has been advised by the experts who advise us on this issue. I recommend that he reads the evidence given to the Defence Committee on this very point by Rear-Admiral Mathews. So the 17-year period is clear, and that must be worked back from 2024, which takes us to 2007. That means that we have to take the decision now if we want parliamentary approval for the concept and design phase. I am sure that if we did not seek parliamentary approval but continued with the work on the concept and design phase, the right hon. and learned Gentleman would be standing up and asking why I had not sought such approval.

David Cameron: There is a difference between a military managed ward and a dedicated military ward—that is the important point. General Sir Richard Dannatt said yesterday that he has
	"every confidence that in three years' time"—
	when the hospital is rebuilt—
	"we will not just have a military managed ward, but effectively a dedicated military ward where our people will be exclusively"—
	exclusively—
	"attended to".
	If it is right for three years' time, why cannot we do more quicker?

Tony Blair: First, I can tell my hon. Friend that I am very happy to welcome the commencement of the tenanancy deposit scheme on 6 April. It represents an end to the scandal of the small minority of unscrupulous landlords who refuse to return rent deposits left with them by short-term tenants. I would also say that the work done by Shelter, Citizens Advice and the NUS has been very important. It is good news for vulnerable tenants and students everywhere.

Owen Paterson: Tarceva has been deemed cost-effective for certain lung cancers in many European countries and North America., but only for British taxpayers with Scottish addresses. My constituent, Richard Burman, has paid his taxes to the British Treasury all his life, but faces a premature death unless he moves to Scotland. Will the Prime Minister please agree to meet him with his specialists to discuss the problem?

Tony Blair: The issue that my right hon. Friend raises is a very serious and important one and I can assure him that we are in touch at the present time with the International Red Cross and other UN agencies. He is right in saying that the Norwegian authorities have played a significant part in trying to put together a peace process in Sri Lanka. I totally understand the difficulties that the Government there face at present; it is a very challenging situation. We have said to them that we will do all we can to help but my right hon. Friend is right to say that the only realistic way to get a solution is to come back to the 2002 agreement and make sure that it is implemented. I know that he will also agree that terrorism and violence can never be the way to achieve a negotiated solution.

Evan Harris: I oppose the motion and urge the House to decline giving the Bill its First Reading. The proposals made by the hon. Member for Upminster (Angela Watkinson) raise serious issues to do with child protection and patient confidence, and that is aside from their potential impact on the sexual health of the part of the population concerned. I speak from the perspective of a medical practitioner and a long-standing member of the British Medical Association's medical ethics committee. I place on record the fact that my partner works in sexual health policy for a charity that deals with the subject.
	The hon. Lady failed to mention the current rules, and to say what guidance exists for health care professionals in this difficult subject. For example, before providing contraception to young people, health professionals must consider whether the patient understands the risks and benefits of the treatment and the advice given, and must discuss with the patient the value of parental support. Doctors must encourage young people to inform parents of the consultation, and if the patient is unwilling to do so, they must explore the reasons.
	It is important for persons under 16 seeking contraceptive advice to be aware that although the doctor is obliged to discuss the value of parental support, the doctor will respect their confidentiality, if necessary, and the fact that they are unwilling to involve their parents, for the reasons given. Before providing contraceptive advice, the doctor must also take into account whether the patient is likely to have sexual intercourse without contraception, and assess whether the patient's physical or mental health, or both, are likely to suffer if the patient does not receive contraceptive advice or treatment.
	Finally, the doctor must consider—this is the key test—whether the patient's best interests require the provision of contraceptive advice or treatment, or both, without parental consent. It is consideration of the patient's best interests that must govern a doctor's behaviour in those difficult circumstances, rather than ideology or unsubstantiated concerns about the public health policy impact of that important requirement for confidentiality, such as those expressed by the hon. Lady.
	The guidelines to which I have just referred are the Fraser guidelines and stem from the Gillick ruling in 1985. At the time, the then Conservative Government recognised that the Law Lords deemed their guidance lawful. They instituted a review of their policy and guidelines as a result of the ruling and no significant change was made. The guidelines that I have set out are broadly those supported at the time by the Conservative Government and the then Health Minister, Barney Hayhoe.
	When the guidelines were challenged again in the Axon case, the current Government welcomed the fact that their guidelines were clearly upheld. The position that I have set out is supported by the British Medical Association, a number of children's charities and people involved in the delivery of sexual health advice to young girls.
	The hon. Lady said little or nothing about the principle of clinical confidentiality and the rights of children in some circumstances to that confidentiality. She said little or nothing about the potential effect of her proposal on the welfare of individual patients who may be at risk of abuse if their confidentiality is not respected including, on rare occasions, from their parents, sadly. If she seriously thinks that it is an acceptable policy to invite a vulnerable young girl to apply to the court for permission for her parents not to be told when she has clear concerns about her safety, she misunderstands the real world in which some people exist.
	It is only on rare occasions that parents are not told or that young people do not involve either their parents or another adult in seeking advice. It is on those rare occasions that we have to have concern, not just for rights and principles, although rights upheld in British common law as well as in human rights law mean that we must have regard to the safety of individual patients. As Brook Advisory Service points out, a father can say, "If you come home pregnant, you're dead." That is not just a rumour; it can happen, and we must be very careful when considering the welfare of young girls in that situation.
	The hon. Lady based her arguments on claims that I believe to be contentious: that sexual health would be improved if girls were threatened with their private lives being opened up to their parents without their consent, come what may. The evidence for this is poor; I note that her speech lacked any significant references to peer-reviewed literature. On the contrary, there is evidence that there is a deterrent to access by the threat of parents being told. Brook Advisory Service, a frontline provider, did a survey of its clients, two thirds of whom said that confidentiality was the single most important factor that affected whether they were willing to seek help. The British Pregnancy Advisory Service has recognised the real concerns that exist in this area.
	There are problems in the current strategy—I accept what the hon. Lady says—but she must recognise the real dangers that exist. As BPAS says,
	"We all wish that every teenager could go to their parents to discuss personal issues like contraception, but the reality is that many of them can't. This may be due to abuse, relationship breakdown, or the parents' own problems. Some parents have such strong religious convictions that the teenager fears that they will be thrown out of home, or will be forced to marry and bring up a child they don't want and can't cope with."
	That is rare, but it is the experience of some. The Bill is also opposed by the Faculty of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.
	If the hon. Lady were saying that the Government's sexual health strategy had not been as effective as we might have liked and that targets may well be missed, we could agree. If her issue was that we wished to reduce all sexually transmitted infections, teenage pregnancies and teenage abortions and, importantly, seek to raise the age of first intercourse, we would agree. The best approach, however, is to continue to improve access to contraception as well as the quality of sex education. I believe—and others support the proposal, including some of those whom I have mentioned—that sex education should be part of the national curriculum. There should be much more effective, earlier access to information in age-appropriate language. It is true that young girls face a barrage of sexualised images, and they are under increasing pressure to sexualise at an early age. I regret that and, indeed, I condemn it, as does everyone on our side of the argument. The answer, however, is not more ignorance, which is what the hon. Member for Upminster has prescribed: it is more information. Other European countries have shown that the earlier provision of clear information in age-appropriate language reduces the number of sexually transmitted infections, pregnancies and abortions, as well as—and this is significant—giving girls and boys the power to resist peer pressure and, in the case of girls, to resist boy pressure, as they have the self-confidence to deal with those difficult negotiations in their teenage years.
	I accept that reform is needed, but in an area different from the one proposed by the hon. Lady. We need easier and fairer access to services, and we need better access to sex education. It is regrettable that the only private Members' Bills that are introduced on the subject seek to limit access to services, rather than improve them. There is a challenge for all Members to seek to liberalise the law on sex education and access to those services, rather than to constrain it.
	The hon. Lady's proposal—I accept that it is well intended—is the wrong way forward. I urge the House to oppose the measure, and to refuse to give the Bill a First Reading.

Margaret Beckett: Yes indeed. I welcome that, as will the whole House. We rely on the Committee chaired by the hon. Gentleman to sustain that scrutiny.
	Since the non-proliferation treaty came into force in 1970, all nuclear weapons states have taken steps to maintain their deterrents. The decisions on which we are seeking agreement today are no different. But the UK has been more open and transparent than any other state in explaining the basis of our decisions in advance to our people and to the international community.
	There are four key issues. I will address each in turn. The first is what are we doing to fulfil our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The second is whether it is still in the national interest to maintain a nuclear deterrent. The third is why such a deterrent should be in the form that we now propose. The final issue is why we need to make this decision now.
	The NPT created two distinct categories of states. Those that had already conducted nuclear tests—ourselves, the US, the Soviet Union, China and France—were designated nuclear weapons states and could legally possess nuclear weapons. All other states-signatory were designated non-nuclear weapons states. Article VI of the NPT imposes an obligation on all states
	"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament".
	The NPT review conference held in 2000 agreed, by consensus, 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. The UK remains committed to these steps and is making progress on them.
	We have been disarming. Since the cold war ended, we have withdrawn and dismantled our tactical maritime and airborne nuclear capabilities. We have terminated our nuclear capable Lance missiles and artillery. We have the smallest nuclear capability of any recognised nuclear weapon state, accounting for less than 1 per cent. of the global inventory, and we are the only nuclear weapon state that relies on a single nuclear system. The Prime Minister has announced a further unilateral reduction in our nuclear weapons in line with our commitment to maintain only the minimum necessary deterrent. We will reduce the stockpile of operationally available warheads by another 20 per cent. to fewer than 160 warheads during the course of this year. This will involve the eventual dismantlement and disposal of about 40 warheads. The UK will then have cut the explosive power of its nuclear weapons by three quarters since the end of the cold war. That is more than any other nuclear weapon state has yet done.

Margaret Beckett: No, I must get on.
	The deterrent is not an alternative to diplomacy. We will keep pushing for multilateral disarmament, keep working through the United Nations to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and keep encouraging nuclear weapon-free zones, including in the middle east. The wider goal of our diplomacy remains to prevent and resolve all conflict by reducing regional tensions—not least between the Palestinians and Israel—by promoting economic development, and by dealing with underlying insecurities such as an unstable climate and the illegal trade in arms. All of that work will continue.
	The third issue lies in the details of the proposals. After thorough and exhaustive analysis, the Government are confident that a submarine system with ballistic missiles remains the most effective and least vulnerable form of deterrent. From that stems the decision to extend the life of the D5 missile. Simply put, it makes no sense to invest in submarines built around the D5 missile unless we have assurance that such a missile will be available after 2024.
	The White Paper makes it clear that we will look hard at whether it is possible to maintain our policy of continuous deterrent patrolling with three boats rather than four through improvements in the technology, operational procedures and maintenance schedule of the new class of submarines. However, we will not take irresponsible risks with our capability, as we rely—unlike others—on a single, minimum system.
	The judgment that we will need to maintain an operational stockpile of fewer than 160 warheads is based on a professional analysis of the minimum that is required to deter. That analysis does not, in our view, support any of the alternative proposals including those made by the Liberal Democrat party for a reduction to just 100 operational warheads. The claim is made that those proposals are based on expert analysis, but nothing whatever has been done to explain either whom the experts were or what the analysis was. We do not believe that such a number would leave us with a credible and effective nuclear deterrent.
	Our estimate is that the costs of operating and maintaining our deterrent between 2020 and 2050 will be equivalent to some 5 or 6 per cent. of the current defence budget—similar to the cost of our current deterrent. The procurement cost of the new submarines and associated equipment and infrastructure will be in the region of £15 billion to £20 billion for a four-boat fleet. Those costs would fall principally between 2012 and 2027. We estimate that the procurement costs are likely on average to be the equivalent of about 3 per cent. of the current defence budget over the main period of expenditure—roughly the same as for the Trident programme. That investment will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities that our armed forces need.

Nick Harvey: I hope very much that the efforts that are being made towards multilateral disarmament, to which the Foreign Secretary restated the Government's commitment and to which the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) restated the Conservative party's commitment, involve sincere commitments. All sane and rational people should be committed to trying to rid the world of nuclear weapons altogether. If the processes running up to 2010 and those that might reasonably follow from it could stave off the dangers of the specific regional proliferations to which I have referred and if the Americans and the Russians could get new energy behind the steps that they have already taken to reducing the number of their warheads, we might begin to develop a situation in which it is reasonable for Britain to consider giving up its nuclear weapons. However, there are an enormous number of "ifs" in that and if a week is a long time in politics, seven years is an eternity.

Nick Harvey: We need to establish a policy for Britain and not for British Aerospace. With respect to the hon. Lady, I believe that British companies are guided by the basis of the contracts that they sign. If we sign a contract approving their doing the concept and design work, they will be rather more interested in that rather than our sending some signal. In the process of sending the signal that she wants to be sent, we will send a signal right around the world that Britain was going to remain a nuclear power until 2055. The workers in British Aerospace will be rather more interested in the contract that the Government sign than they will be in getting the signal of the sort that she suggests.
	I refer back to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Willie Rennie) made earlier. Former President Gorbachev was exactly on the mark when he said that Britain should not make a decision before the 2010 NPT conference. He added:
	"The UK Government's rush to deploy nuclear missiles whose service life would extend until 2050 is...astonishing".
	He is entirely right. I also refer to the comments of Kofi Annan speaking in November. He recognised the more dangerous strategic context to which I have referred and said:
	"We are sleepwalking towards disaster...worse than that—we are asleep at the controls of a fast-moving aircraft. Unless we wake up and take control, the outcome is all too predictable."
	He went on that to say that if Britain took the decision to renew our system now to take us through to 2055, it would inhibit and damage the part that we could play.  [ Interruption. ] Yes it is what he said; it is pretty much exactly what he said.

Des Browne: This is the first time that I have heard a Liberal Democrat spokesman say in a debate that a decision does need to be taken now. I have always understood the Liberal Democrats' position to be that this was not the right time to the make the decision. Will the hon. Gentleman make it clear to the House that if the position that he is now arguing is not that we should go back to the way in which things were previously done, it is quite avowedly that we should make a decision about the design and concept of a new fleet of submarines, but that we should not do that in any way that it is informed by principle—because the principle does not need to be addressed now? That is what he is saying.

Jon Trickett: I beg to move, To leave out from "House" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
	"notes the Government's decision, as set out in the White Paper The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), to take the steps necessary to maintain the UK minimum strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the existing system and to take further steps towards meeting the United Kingdom's disarmament responsibilities under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but believes that the case is not yet proven and remains unconvinced of the need for an early decision."
	In the few minutes that I have I want to tackle a number of arguments. I begin by paying tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, South (Nigel Griffiths) for the friendship that he showed to Back Benchers in his recent post and more particularly for the friendship that he showed to miners waiting for compensation in my constituency and throughout the country. He was a good friend to the miners and did a huge amount of work during those years. He is now tempting the House into, in effect, an immediate unilateralist position. I want to argue that there is no reason for us to proceed immediately in that direction.
	First, I want to remind Members exactly what these weapons are, because that seems to have been forgotten. They are the most destructive instruments that mankind has ever been able to create. The Nagasaki bomb killed 140,000 human beings. The weapons that we have now have eight times that capacity. There is the capacity to kill—to fry, in effect—1 million people with the explosion of a single device. Our submarines have the capacity to deliver 48 of those. We are talking about a huge destructive capacity—an awesome capacity—which we must all think very carefully about. It is that thought that leads me to the position that I have adopted and to the argument that I want to try to develop in the few minutes that I have at my disposal.
	It seems to me that the Secretary of State made little of what is, in a way, the most important point, which is that the debate is taking place this afternoon thanks to the Government's finding the time. I pay due respect to the Government and to the Secretary of State for the good-spirited way in which the debate has been handled. But, frankly, the arguments that have been deployed are specious. I want to look at three of them.
	The first argument is about unilateralism. A straw man has been erected in relation to the amendments in the names of 113 Members. It has been argued that, somehow or other, a unilateral decision has been suggested. The fact of the matter is that the only unilateralists in the House are those who are arguing for unilateral rearmament now. What I would like to see, as I am sure many hon. Members would, is a period of time during which we can get the arguments right and enter a process of multilateral discussions, possibly leading to a round of disarmament, under the NPT, which we are legally obliged to undertake—

James Arbuthnot: Whatever the merits of the debate, the Royal Navy, Aldermaston and British companies have, with our American allies, maintained a continuous at-sea deterrent for many decades, which is an astonishing achievement of which they should be proud.
	In this Parliament, the Defence Committee has conducted three inquiries on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We have intended—successfully, I think—to encourage and inform a comprehensive debate on the future of the deterrent. I pay particular tribute to the members of the Select Committee for the constructive way in which they have carried out these controversial inquiries.
	The White Paper is an important document. This is the first time that we have had such openness and such a debate at this stage. I welcome that, and I think that the courage of the Government in coming to the House in such a way should be commended. I have been waiting for this debate to make my conclusions. I do not want to disparage those who take a different view—I have found the decision extremely difficult.
	First, I would like to go through the arguments against the Government's proposal. This is an awful lot of money to spend on something of doubtful usefulness. At a time when we are funding our armed forces at a peacetime level, this seems an odd priority. We believe that we are the closest allies of the United State of America, and what do we add by buying this deterrent? We add a bit of uncertainty in the minds of the potential aggressor, but that is an awfully expensive bit of uncertainty. And how can we say to North Korea and Iran, "We can, but you can't"? It is not that our going for unilateral nuclear disarmament would have any persuasive power with them—clearly it would not—but making such statements does reduce our moral authority.
	The Government have made little attempt to explain how deterrence works. The purpose of having nuclear weapons will have failed if we ever have to use them, yet the only point of having them is that someone might think that we might use them. It is on the basis of such arguments that we are spending £20 billion. When could we use them? Perhaps the only scenario is that the United Kingdom will not know who has exploded a nuclear weapon, and then what would we do? Could we use them in retaliation? I believe that retaliation, as such, is illegal. We can use them to hit back in self-defence, but by the time that we are involved in a nuclear exchange, all thoughts of stopping anyone else from doing anything again will be long dead, along with most of us. Perhaps those rules are suspended in war, but that is far from clear. Legally, perhaps we could only use the weapons if we were firing them in first use, and that is a rather scary prospect.
	The Foreign Secretary said that the deterrent was an "insurance policy" against an uncertain threat, but talk of an insurance policy is simply wrong. If someone destroys a house, the purpose of an insurance policy is to pay to rebuild the house; it is not to destroy the house of the person who destroyed it. Let us find a better analogy. The best one that I can think of is a booby trap. The Secretary of State assures us that if someone walks into our "house", there is a likelihood that that devastating booby trap, wandering round the oceans of the world, will go off. That is not like any insurance policy of which I have ever heard. In what circumstances could the horribly high rate of collateral damage caused by a nuclear weapon be justified? It is hard to deter those who have a religious conviction that death is better than life, or who are irrational, so the weapons are aimed at a tiny proportion of the threats against us—those from rationally led states. That is not a conclusive argument, but the equipment is very expensive for deterring that sort of threat.
	I am not convinced that we can delay the decision; I think that we have to make it today.

James Arbuthnot: I was a grateful recipient of my hon. Friend's brilliant essay on nuclear deterrence, which partially persuaded me. For the reasons that I have given, I have decided to support the proposal. I am not inclined to take the risk of allowing the unilateral nuclear disarmament of this country to send us naked into the conference chamber, as Nye Bevan once put it. The trouble is that those considerations apply just as strongly to Iran as they do to the United Kingdom. Why should we expect a proud Iranian nation to go naked into the conference chamber? It is a difficult question. My answer is that we have the world that we have.
	We would like a world with no nuclear weapons in it, but there is not the smallest hope of achieving that without gradually reducing the nuclear weapons of those states that have them, while doing our utmost to ensure that no new countries acquire them. Will we succeed? I am sad to say that I doubt it, because I am profoundly pessimistic about the future of the world. Climate change has the capacity to make the planet uninhabitable for humans, and now that nuclear technology has been invented, it will never go away. There are nuclear weapons around, and sooner or later one or more of them will get into the hands of people who we would rather did not have them. We now have the ability to destroy the world, and I regret to say that it is natural human behaviour that when we have the ability to do something, sooner or later we try it out. I believe that that will happen before climate change has had time to do its work.

Michael Mates: It is a real pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), who succeeded me in the Chair of the Defence Committee, so we have now heard a triumvirate with broadly similar views.
	Unlike some other speakers, I do not want to deal with the strategic issues that underlie the question of whether to maintain our independent deterrent. The House will not be surprised to hear that I agree that we should keep it, although the arguments in favour are quite different from the time when we were debating whether to replace Polaris with Trident, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) said, and the case is not as clear cut as it was then. I want to explain why I believe that if we update our deterrent, the sort of deterrent we need will be different from when we took that decision.
	In 1980 the world was bitterly divided between blocs—NATO and the Warsaw pact—and in those circumstances it was no wonder that we maintained a 24-hour, 365-day a year deterrent. It consisted not just of the Polaris missiles, but of free-fall nuclear bombs, nuclear depth charges and Lance surface-to-surface missiles based in Germany. It was a formidable arsenal, but with the end of the cold war most of it has been stood down. No one today would seek to justify the level of deterrent we believed we needed then. The political and strategic picture is wholly different.
	The different threat level is already reflected in the way in which the deterrent now operates—there is one submarine on patrol and I understand that it is at several days notice to fire, rather than on continuous alert. Since 1994, the missiles have been de-targeted.
	The level and immediacy of the threat is now regarded as so low that the submarines can undertake hydrographic work and join in naval exercises with other vessels. The sub-strategic deterrent that was considered essential now consists of one Trident missile with one warhead rather than a multiple weapons system. We should welcome that reduction in the size and scale of our deterrent posture; it fits with the times we live in and is consistent with our international obligations on the reduction of nuclear capability. A renewed deterrent will need to be equally flexible to respond to any changes in the strategic picture over its long lifespan. It will also need, in financial terms, not to be too much of a drain on an already over-stretched defence budget.
	In considering a replacement for the current deterrent, the White Paper examines various options. It rejects the notion that a land-based system would be practical. Equally understandably, it rejects as too costly and impractical the notion of a surface ship carrying ballistic missiles. Finally, the option of an air-based deterrent with converted aircraft has been turned down, not least because cruise missiles are vulnerable to being shot down and are unreliable, and no nuclear cruise missile could be introduced without testing it—and such a test is forbidden by the test ban treaty.
	The Government have rightly decided that the new deterrent will be based on submarines similar to the Polaris and Trident systems. The issue in 1980 was whether we needed four or five such boats in order to maintain a continuous deterrent. Today, the question is whether we could manage with three. I believe that the Government need to give serious consideration to both the number of new submarines and to their size. In their White Paper, the Government say the decision has yet to be taken on how many submarines will be required. Quite rightly, Ministers take the view that we must have sufficient submarines in order that a continuous at-sea deterrent can be maintained. I agree with that, but we need to consider whether and how we might devise a way of meeting that requirement in a manner that could reduce both the capital and the running costs.
	Given the change in the strategic picture and the unlikelihood of a sudden massive attack that required the availability of an instant response to deter it, I believe that we should look at the possibilities of international co-operation to meet our deterrent needs. In that regard, we should explore the possibility of coming to an understanding with the French. Before eyebrows reach the ceiling, let me say that I am not talking about the security implications, simply about patrolling. The French see themselves as having a similar deterrent requirement to ourselves and they are in the process of updating their independent deterrent, but now with four submarines instead of five.
	It has always been the position of successive Governments that the only way to guarantee one ballistic missile submarine at sea all the time is from a fleet of four. That relates to the right hon. Member for Walsall, South's point about the possibility of an accident. However, if an understanding could be reached whereby the at-sea and, therefore, invulnerable deterrent was shared between ourselves and France at times, it seems to me possible, or even likely, that each of us could manage with one submarine fewer. Such an arrangement need not in any way affect the integrity or independence of our deterrent, nor need there be any degradation of the security relating to targeting, pay loads, patrol patterns or anything else. It would simply involve an agreement over the timing of the departure and return of each country's deterrent patrol. There would thus be a guarantee of a European deterrent at sea in the unlikely event of a surprise or short-notice nuclear attack. Such a scenario may seem unlikely or even impossible as we speak, but we are talking about the uncertainties, both strategic and political, of the next 30 or 40 years. Had we been taking such decisions in 1980, when the right hon. Member for Walsall, South and I were debating this, and painting a picture of 30 or 40 years' time, we would have been seriously wrong about the timing of the ending of the cold war.
	I immediately hear objections that one cannot rely on the French and that their priorities might be different from ours, but I do not believe that those form an insuperable barrier to co-operation. While a French deterrent patrol was at sea, we could maintain a submarine alongside, ready to sail in a matter of hours. I believe that a ballistic missile could even be fired alongside should an attack appear with no or little warning, unlikely as that is. I think that that is technically possible. However, that is not the threat we are aiming to meet because a no-notice attack is in the realm of the most unlikely, bordering on impossible, at the moment.
	Last year, on a visit to Brest—the headquarters of France's deterrent forces command—I discussed this thought with Admiral Boiffin, the commander of all France's strategic deterrent assets. He readily agreed that there could be considerable cost savings on both sides if there were to be co-operation and he acknowledged that he could see no military objections, given the extreme pressure on defence budgets. But, of course, he added that it was not a decision for him but for his political masters in Paris. That is why I am putting it to our political masters in London. I commend this thought—it is only a thought—to the House as a serious way to try to maintain our deterrent in the most cost-effective manner.
	The second area where I believe the change in the type of threat merits a change in the operation of the deterrent is over the size of any submarines. We can reduce their size and we do not need as many tubes. If we can get some sort of synergy between the next generation of ballistic submarines and the next generation of hunter-killer submarines, there are huge potential cost savings.
	Overall, in replacing this deterrent we need to look for cost-effectiveness and co-operation, and a way to do that with the least impact on a defence budget that is already very stretched.

Gavin Strang: The House should not forget that the scale of indiscriminate destruction that can be unleashed by a single nuclear warhead is unparalleled. It was Nikita Khrushchev who said that in a nuclear war, the survivors would envy the dead. Almost by definition, nuclear weapons inflict death and suffering on civilians, and the suffering is not confined to those present at the blast. Descendants of survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still being born with genetic defects today. The House will be aware that the current generation of so-called small nuclear weapons are many times more powerful than the two dropped in Japan at the end of the second world war.
	I spent most of my political life during the cold war. There was a very real fear in Europe in particular that there really would be a nuclear war. There was a recognition on the part of many of the leading countries, including the United States and Britain, that if nothing were done, it would only be a matter of time before a large number of countries acquired nuclear weapons. This was a terrifying prospect. Clearly the more countries that have nuclear weapons, the greater the chance that they will be used. It is against this background that the international community, with Britain playing a major role, resolved that the world should instead become free of nuclear weapons. In 1968, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was agreed, and it was ratified in 1970.
	At the heart of the treaty is a deal between the non-nuclear weapons states and the nuclear weapons states. The non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons; in return, those states get assistance with civil uses of nuclear energy and, crucially, the promise of complete nuclear disarmament from the nuclear weapons states. It is generally believed that the non-proliferation regime, with the non-proliferation treaty at its heart, has played an important role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the nine or so states currently believed to hold them. The treaty is, as Ministers have put it, the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
	The end of the cold war brought a window of opportunity to make real progress in fully implementing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The tragedy is that this is not the way in which it is turning out. In recent years, there has been growing disillusionment among the non-nuclear weapons states. They fear that the nuclear weapons states are not prepared to fulfil their disarmament obligations. The world's non-proliferation mechanisms desperately need strengthening. That window of opportunity still exists.
	No country is better placed than Britain to make a major contribution internationally in this field. After all, neither Britain nor western Europe is subject to any direct military threat and the Government have stated that no such threat is foreseen. This is the time when Britain should be taking the initiative to encourage nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is profoundly depressing that the Government want to procure a new generation of Trident.
	The decision to buy a new generation of Trident would damage non-proliferation efforts. After all, we have an obligation to move towards complete disarmament, and making provision to renew Trident clearly runs counter to that obligation. We seek to persuade non-nuclear weapons states not to pursue nuclear weapons programmes, and we seek to persuade the international community of the need to strengthen the world's non-proliferation mechanisms. Those exhortations will be met with increasing cynicism if, at the same time as we make them, we buy a new generation of Trident. It will not be just our credibility that is damaged—faith in the world's non-proliferation regimes will be further undermined. By renewing Trident we will effectively say to other countries that nuclear weapons are so vital that we are prepared to spend billions of pounds to make sure that we have them in the 2020s and beyond, even though the Government admit that we do not face a foreseeable direct military threat. Far from persuading other nations to remain non-nuclear, we will send a signal that nuclear weapons are vital.
	The Government argue that we should renew Trident, not because of any foreseeable threat, but because we cannot accurately predict the nature of the world in 30 or 50 years' time. Surely, the same is true for any country in the world. Germany, Japan and Egypt, for example, do not know what threats will face them in the 2020s and beyond. There is nothing in the Government's justification for renewing Trident that does not apply to every country in the world. That clearly undermines our argument that non-nuclear weapon states should continue to forgo nuclear weapons. The Government rightly say that we do not know what the future holds, but we can be sure that a decision not to renew Trident would avoid the damage that would be done to non-proliferation efforts if we go ahead with renewal.
	I would like the UK to decommission Trident. Other countries have given up nuclear weapons: South Africa abandoned its nuclear programme, as has Libya, and Ukraine got rid of its nuclear weapons too. We applauded those countries for the course that they took. None of the countries that abandoned their nuclear programmes are any less secure, and neither would we be. Indeed, Britain would be a safer place if we did not renew Trident because, first, we would avoid the detrimental impact of Trident renewal on the non-proliferation regimes and, secondly, we could spend our defence budget more effectively. Instead of spending £20 billion on renewing Trident and £1.5 every year running it, Britain could put more resources into defence equipment and operations more relevant to our security needs in the 21st century.
	The prospect of nuclear proliferation is as dreadful today as it was in the 1960s, when the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was agreed. This is a critical period, and the decisions that we make today will have an important bearing on the deployment of nuclear weapons world wide. Consideration of whether to procure a new generation of nuclear weapons should take place in the context of the role that Britain should play in the world today. My vision of Britain is of a leader in global non-proliferation, keeping our commitments and strengthening the world's nuclear safeguards, which is why I will vote against the renewal of Trident.

Malcolm Rifkind: When a Minister resigns on an issue of principle, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Nigel Griffiths) has, one must pay tribute to his integrity. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) made a brave and important speech this afternoon, and he also deserves a tribute for his integrity. I hope, however, that they will both forgive me for saying that I believe that they are fundamentally mistaken. I believe passionately that deterrence has been seen to work in the past and that it continues to be very persuasive for the future.
	During the cold war, which could at any time have led to a hot war, I had no doubt that the Soviet Union would have contemplated conventional aggression but was deterred from doing so by the realisation on both sides that any conventional attack could quickly escalate into something far more awesome. That mutual restraint was a crucial consideration, and it differentiates countries such as the United Kingdom from some of the rogue states that might be contemplating acquiring a nuclear weapon. It was asked what difference it would make to a country such as Iran if Britain did not give up its nuclear weapons, but I believe that there is a fundamental distinction.
	I would also say to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes that even bad Governments, evil states and aggressive regimes can be deterred. They are not all irrational. We now know that, during the Gulf war, the United States made it clear to Saddam Hussein that, if he used the chemical weapons that he had at that time, he would invite a similar response. There is every reason to believe that that carried considerable credibility.
	I had the privilege of serving as Defence Secretary for three years, and for having responsibility for our Trident programme at the time. However, it was not me but the Prime Minister who would have had to take any decision on the use of that deterrent. When I was appointed Foreign Secretary, however, I found that I was one of two Ministers nominated by the then Prime Minister to act on his behalf in the event of either his death or incapacity at a time of grave crisis for this country. That is a pretty sobering responsibility with which suddenly to find oneself. I share with all Members, including those with whom I disagree, the realisation that nuclear weapons, unless dealt with in a sane and responsible fashion, can have awful consequences for the world in which we live.
	Why do I come to a different conclusion? I do so for several seasons, which I have no hesitation in sharing with the House. Of course, the cold war is over and the threat that we faced at that time is unlikely to reappear, but it is not guaranteed that it cannot reappear. We are going to live in a world in which the United States and Russia will remain nuclear superpowers for the foreseeable future. The two powers of the future, India and China, are already nuclear powers. What are the implications for western Europe? Were Britain and, I presume, France to be persuaded by the arguments that we have heard from certain quarters, will western Europe be unable to defend itself from the kind of threat that, however unlikely, could arise? In the context of half a century, we cannot assume that the nuclear umbrella that the United States has provided will necessarily continue to be available.
	The likely problem has never been that we would be attacked with nuclear weapons, but that a nuclear-armed aggressor could say to a country disarmed of nuclear weapons, "Unless you concede to our requirements, we will threaten to use our nuclear weapons against you, in the knowledge that you cannot retaliate." That is what deterrence is about; unless we have the capacity to deter, we are able to be blackmailed and have no alternative but to concede.

Don Touhig: Britain is a nuclear power, and has been a nuclear power for 50 years. We became a nuclear power at the end of the last war when we faced a threat from the then Soviet Union, and the development of the uncertainty of the cold war emphasised that threat. Fortunately the cold war has passed into the history books, but I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) that, given the way in which Russia has developed and is developing, there is no certainty that we can be secure in our relations with that country.
	Now we are faced with new dangers and new threats from international terrorism and potential rogue states that would seek to undermine international security by sponsoring acts of terrorism, which could involve dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. In 1956, who would have predicted that in 2007 countries such as North Korea, India and Pakistan would have a nuclear capability, or that Iran would have nuclear ambitions? Now, in 2007, who can predict with any certainty the threats and challenges that this country, and indeed the international community, will face in 2024? That inability to predict the future means that scrapping the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent would be a grave mistake, not just for this generation but for future generations.
	The White Paper sets out three possible scenarios. We might face the re-emergence of a strategic nuclear threat, we might face the emergence of a new nuclear threat, or we might face the deliberate equipping of terrorist groups with nuclear weapons by a state sponsor. Each of those scenarios might seem too terrible to imagine, but sadly any one of them is possible, and it is for that reason that we must retain our nuclear deterrent.
	Those who say that the way forward is merely to give up nuclear weapons must prove that we would not become a soft target for state-sponsored terrorism, or for others who seek to threaten us. I know that, in truth, it is not possible to prove that. While I appreciate the arguments that are advanced, I think it is naïve to suggest that if we gave up our nuclear deterrent, states with nuclear ambitions would follow our example. That is not the real world. Life is not like that; would that it were.
	By making the decision to maintain our deterrent system beyond the life of the Vanguards with a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines and extending the life of the Trident D5 missiles, we are renewing the insurance policy that we have had since the end of the war to protect us against those would threaten our security. Would any householder faced with the uncertain prospects of storms and other bad weather not make sure that he or she had a proper insurance policy? In an unpredictable an uncertain world, that has to be right for us.
	As all the attention has been focused on the renewal of Trident, it is easy to overlook the fact that the White Paper also commits us to a further 20 per cent. cut in operationally available warheads. That is a good step forward that should be welcomed by all Members. For all the uproar over the renewal of our nuclear submarines, there is a clear commitment from this Government that any nuclear deterrent should be sensible and set at the minimum level necessary for the future defence needs of the United Kingdom.
	Some might say that we can put off making this decision. That is wrong and lacks political courage. When I look at the Members representing the Liberal Democrats, I wonder where is the party of Gladstone and Lloyd George—the party that had the conviction and moral courage to take the decisions of the day and not run away from them. It will take an estimated 17 years to design, build and fully deploy a new submarine. A delay in making a decision would mean that there might be a period when there is a substantial gap in the possession of our deterrent. In what is a rapidly changing world, that is a risk, and we can ill afford to take it.
	Attention has been drawn to the cost of the nuclear deterrent, and I am sure that that will be referred to again in other contributions. Indeed, it is right to draw attention to the cost of the Trident replacement. The capital cost of replacing the submarines and extending the life of the missiles is estimated to be £15 billion to £20 billion over 15 years. I agree that that is a massive cost, but if history teaches us anything it is that our freedom is not bought cheaply. There is a cost to preserving our way of life. I, for one, would prefer that we defend our freedom by deploying this deterrent than by sending millions of our young men to the killing fields of war, as we did twice in the last century.

Michael Meacher: No, I am not giving way again.
	Not only are the warheads designed by the US, but several crucial components without which the system could not work are manufactured in the US, and the system is also reliant on US software for all aspects of targeting. What is even more serious in respect of our over-dependence on the US is that the US provides this kit to us not because they believe that we are necessary to the defence of the west, but because it makes us subservient to US foreign policy. We have already seen that with Iraq and Lebanon, and could well see it again over Iran. I, for one, believe that that is a political price far too high to pay for the next 30 or 40 years.
	The enormous cost, of a distinctly vague and uncertain role, has already been touched on. Even MOD officials have admitted that the lifetime costs of Trident renewal could be two to three times the £15 billion to £20 billion figures mentioned in the White Paper—and that covers only the initial building of the system. That is close to the £75 billion I mentioned earlier, which is the amount arrived at by the independent think-tank, the British American Security Information Council.
	Figures of that magnitude starkly expose the recently highlighted funding gap within the MOD's current procurement plans beyond 2012. That includes some major equipment procurement such as two carriers, the joint strike fighters and possibly a third tranche of Typhoon Eurofighters. The budget means that we cannot have both those and Trident together: we have to make a choice. I would submit that those systems are likely to be far more relevant and valuable for our defence capability in future than nuclear weapons.
	The truth is that none of our wars have been won with nuclear weapons and none of our enemies deterred by them. General Galtieri was not deterred from seizing the Falklands, even though we had nuclear weapons and he did not. The US had nuclear weapons, but that did not prevent them from being defeated in Vietnam and now in Iraq. The French had nuclear weapons, but that did not prevent them from being chased out of Indo-China and Algeria. Israel, of course, had nuclear weapons, but that did not prevent them from being evicted from Lebanon by Hezbollah in 2000 and again last year.
	The only argument that the Government and the Opposition fall back on is that we might one day in the hypothetical future, in a worse-case scenario, face a rogue state. However, the logic of the "rogue state" argument, as has rightly been pointed out, is that if we need nuclear weapons against such an eventuality, so does everybody else—not just Iran but the 40 or so technologically advanced states that are already capable of producing nuclear weapons. The question that then arises, which we need to answer tonight, is whether British will really be a safer place if we trigger a spate of nuclear proliferation across the world leading to regional arms races and a world of 40 or more nuclear states. Far from the risk of nuclear war being diminished, I submit that it is far more likely to be enhanced—whether from miscalculation, terrorist acquisition or another cause.
	There is no question that renewing Trident will undermine the spirit of the non-proliferation treaty. There has been a lot of discussion about that, but let us be clear that the deal in that treaty is that the non-nuclear countries will not seek nuclear weapons, on condition that nuclear countries move steadily and in good faith to full—I emphasise the word "full"—nuclear disarmament. If we decide to renew Trident, that will be a clear message that the nuclear states—although I entirely concede that they are making some important reductions in their nuclear weaponry—are nevertheless still baulking at the end process of nuclear disarmament. That is all too likely in time to lead to a steady growth of further proliferation among a whole swathe of non-nuclear states. Ultimately, that could prove unstoppable.
	No one—certainly not me—supports the view that Britain can unilaterally bring about nuclear disarmament worldwide. That is a complete canard. Of course we cannot, but there is a window of opportunity. Most experts agree that there is no requirement for an immediate decision to be taken on this issue before at least 2014. That gives us an invaluable opportunity to take the lead, which is what I think we should do, in trying to set up a multinational, multilateral nuclear disarmament conference embracing not only the existing nuclear states but also the non-nuclear states who might be tempted to go down this route, in order to give a decisive multilateral push to halting nuclear proliferation.

John Barrett: It is good to follow a few excellent speeches in the debate. I particularly compliment the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) who, as the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) said, was the Member for Edinburgh, South before the current hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Nigel Griffiths), who has made his resignation speech. The right hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang) was of very much the same opinion, and I am sure that the Labour Member for Edinburgh, North and Leith (Mark Lazarowicz) will also oppose the Government tonight, as will I as the Member for Edinburgh, West. There may be something in the water.
	Tonight's decision on Trident will haunt the House if we get it wrong. If anyone is still wondering why there is a rush to make a decision now, the answer is clear. The Americans are extending the life of their D5 Trident missiles and they want answers in 2007. They need to know whether we are willing to join them. There is no pressing military, political, technical or other reason to make the decision now. The only reason we are being bounced into this decision is because of the current Prime Minister and his wish to leave the country's hands tied long after he has gone. It is not the submarines that are reaching the end of their shelf life; it is the Prime Minister.

John Barrett: I am sure that the Chancellor would like to see the dirty deed done for him before he comes into office. In the Government's White Paper we are told that only the Prime Minister can push the nuclear button. That is of little comfort to many inside and outside the House.
	I am glad to be called to speak in the debate, because not only do I feel strongly about this issue, but I know that many of my constituents feel the same way. Many have written to me and some have asked for copies of the Government's document on the future of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. Others have written on behalf of larger groups and organisations, for example, the Churches.

Stephen Crabb: Like a previous speaker, I have received not a single letter from any of my constituents urging me to vote with the Government tonight in favour of replacing Trident. However, not for one moment do I think that there is not a strong understanding in my constituency and throughout the country of the need for this House to vote in favour of a replacement tonight. Yes, our constituents put us here to talk about the most immediate and pressing issues that they face, and for many those are public services, NHS dentistry, and the closure of accident and emergency wards and local tax offices, for example. However, they also put us here to take the difficult and unattractive decisions that do not satisfy any immediate interests, but which are nevertheless vital to the national interest. The decision before us tonight is one such decision.
	A number of constituents and local church and environmental groups have contacted me, expressing concern about, and opposition to, the notion that we should support replacing Trident. I do not intend to discuss all the various arguments, a number of which have already been covered more than adequately, but one idea that has some currency in the country is that Parliament has not been given enough opportunities to examine rigorously all the issues affecting the decision that we are about to take. That notion has been scotched well and truly, however. There have been three Select Committee reports and a White Paper, and numerous opportunities for Members to visit Her Majesty's naval base Clyde, at Faslane and Coulport, in order to have frank discussions with a wide variety of service and civilian personnel in management and operational roles, and to question them about the nature of our deterrent and how it is managed. So Parliament has had adequate opportunity to scrutinise the issues before us.
	A number of my constituents have also expressed the view that since the end of the cold war, the world has changed so fundamentally that nuclear weapons and the nuclear deterrent are redundant. A local church group said to me that since 9/11, the world had changed so much that nuclear weapons had no place any more. It is true that since the end of the cold war, the nature of the threat has changed; no one is pretending otherwise. It is also true that our nuclear capability and posture and the configuration of our nuclear resources have changed to reflect that change.
	In some of the correspondence that I have received, the view has also been expressed that since 9/11 a new era has been ushered in, in which terrorist attacks have displaced the threat of strategic nuclear strikes, and that because nuclear weapons are less relevant in the war on terrorism, they are redundant in this new era. That view is dangerously misguided. Of course nuclear weapons are futile in deterring someone from blowing themselves up on the No. 12 bus, but so is most of the kit that comprises most of our conventional warfare capability. The fact is that the nuclear deterrent serves a very limited but vital purpose: to help create the conditions in which a nuclear attack on the United Kingdom would be futile, and therefore highly unlikely.
	There has been a lot of discussion this afternoon about what is unknown about the future strategic threats that this country will face in the decades ahead. There is indeed a lot that we do not know, but there are some assumptions that we can make. We can assume that the number of countries seeking to acquire a nuclear capability will increase. Although we might have no idea of the intent in the decades ahead of countries that will have such a capability, we can fairly safely assume that the march of political freedom and liberalism across the globe will not progress uniformly. There will continue to be points of collision between the values of liberalism—it is one of our country's destinies to promote those values throughout the globe—and manifestations of tyranny. So it is not totally outlandish to envisage a scenario in which the UK might once again be a target of a nuclear state.
	In a world in which an increasing number of rogue states and illiberal regimes are seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, it is essential that a core of strong liberal democratic nations retain their nuclear deterrents for the foreseeable future. While it is difficult to identify any nation on earth now whose nuclear capability combines with an aggressive intent to pose an existing threat to the UK, the fact is that we can never say that such a threat will not re-emerge in the decades ahead. A minimum credible nuclear deterrent is therefore vital. Trident has proved successful as a flexible and secure platform for maintaining that deterrent, and the time has come for the House to make the positive decision to replace it.

Peter Kilfoyle: Unlike the Foreign Secretary, I was never a member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Nor have I ever been a unilateralist or a pacifist. On the other hand, I have never had anything to do with the kind of swivel-eyed, Dr. Strangelove-type reactionaries, who for some reason I always associate in my own mind with the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis).
	There is something worrying about the occupants of the two Front Benches coming together on an issue that has echoes of Iraq all over again. Much of the argument has been made on the basis of fear, uncertainty and disinformation. We all know where similar arguments took us in March 2003. This is obviously a different subject, and there are strongly held feelings on both sides. I also appreciate that some hon. Members have strong constituency interests, but I have noted two points especially in the debate today.
	The first was a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) when he said that he had a sense of déjà vu. So did I, especially when I heard the speeches by my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) and the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). They had the benefit of consistency in what they had to say, but they were talking about a situation that obtained 20 or 25 years ago. Matters have moved on a great deal since then.
	The second point is about the way in which the same tactics are employed to knock down propositions that have not been put. I have heard many references to unilateral disarmament, as if hon. Members would have a chance to support that option tonight. That is not true; it is a fallacious argument, and it is typical of the kind of debating cul-de-sac that we are taken into on such occasions.
	The key question is time. I am reminded of the classic film "Clockwise". The John Cleese character organises his day to the very second so that he can ascend to the heady position of chairman of the Headmasters Conference. Of course everything goes awry, but he is determined to have his day. I tend to think that this debate is connected to the Prime Minister's approaching abdication from his post. That is behind the rush to push the issue to a conclusion tonight. I can see no other reason why this decision must be made now.
	Many hon. Members have talked of this decision being an insurance policy. This must be the only insurance policy to be taken out against we know not whom, based in countries we know not where, and with weapons we know not what. We are told that at some point in the indeterminate future we may need weapons against a country that will repeat the threats of the 1970s and 1980s. Frankly, I just do not buy that.
	Nor do I buy into any of the other arguments that have been put about the need to take this decision now. I wonder why the Americans need a mere 13-year lead-in time to build one of their superior submarines, compared to the 17 years that we need. That is very odd. We will also be going back to the very same supplier who provided us with an inferior product before, which—according to the latest Government estimates—will last only 25 years, when the Americans' system lasts 40 years. That is most perplexing. What happens to our procurement policies—

Peter Kilfoyle: I am grateful for the Secretary of State's advice, but that was 30 years ago, and time has moved on—not only that, but it depends who we believe about the design life of these particular vessels. Until comparatively recently, we were told that the lifespan of the Vanguard class submarine was 30 years minimum—not 30 years maximum, not 25 years with a possible extension of another five years, but 30 years minimum.  [Interruption.] It is all very well for Opposition Members to point to the Select Committee report, but I am telling the House what Ministers and senior members of the Ministry of Defence—including Lord Moonie, with whom I checked this information today—stated at the time, as a matter of public record. They were adamant that there would be a minimum life of 30 years.
	Is it not strange that our American friends base the life of their vessels from the ship-going period of their commission rather than from when they are first launched, as there is a gap? If the figures are fiddled around with, it is possible to argue, given the lead-in time and the lifespan that we now attribute to those vessels, that we should be putting in our orders now. It seems, however, that the figures—and, indeed, part of the science—have been conjectured to fit around the political desirability of taking a decision now.
	We are told that we have expert advice. The one issue on which I agreed with the Prime Minister on 4 December was the fact that such things are "a matter of judgment". It is indeed a matter of judgment, and for every scientist who says that this is what we should be doing now, other scientists can be produced who say the opposite. For example, Dick Garwin has already been mentioned, and advocates of the Select Committee's paper will agree that he appeared before it. However, Dick Garwin did not speak, as someone claimed he did, only on behalf of Philip Coyle; he also spoke on behalf of Ted Postol, who designed the Trident system in the first place, and Frank von Hippel, who was one of the designers of the warheads that we copy.
	I have to say that if eminent scientists are giving advice—they actually believe in nuclear deterrence and are party to these decisions not only as scientists, but as leading members of various administrations—it behoves us to listen to what they have to say. We should not be bounced into taking a decision here tonight that pre-empts the sort of informed debate that needs to happen before the House can take a properly objective and science-based decision.

Anne Milton: I will be brief.  [ Interruption. ] I will have to be brief. That is four seconds gone.
	There is considerable misunderstanding in the House about what we are deciding. The Foreign Secretary's comments that we are not committing ourselves irreversibly to a nuclear deterrent, but are taking steps to maintain a nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the existing system, are important. When the Secretary of State for Defence sums up, he cannot emphasise that strongly enough. I had the privilege of visiting HMS Clyde last year as part of the armed forces parliamentary scheme. No one who visits there who could fail to be outstandingly impressed by the professionalism of our armed forces. That professionalism equips members of the Royal Navy not only to spend 90 days at the bottom of the sea—not something that I would relish—but to deliver the extraordinarily impressive security arrangements that I saw. My visit clarified some of my thoughts about whether we continue to need a nuclear deterrent.
	There is clearly much on which hon. Members agree. Although this sounds like motherhood and apple pie, it is important to make the point that none of us wants to have a nuclear deterrent. We would all wish that the resolution of conflicts throughout the world could be brought about by negotiation. However, we live in the real world, and the real world has become less safe. I was not a Member of the House when the decision on the invasion of Iraq was taken. I regret that decision deeply, and I believe that its repercussions will be with us for many years to come. However, none of us can predict with any certainty the threats that this country will face over the next 20 years.
	There are three points that I would like the Secretary of State for Defence to clarify in simple terms that can be understood by hon. Members, especially those who have concerns about the proposal. We need a justification for why the decision needs to be taken now. I have something in common with the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), in that I am utterly confused by the Liberal Democrats' position.
	We need to know whether the replacement of any part of the deterrent will remain solely and completely in the control of the UK. We also need to know whether the process would harm or compromise any part of the non-proliferation treaty. Will we continue to pursue a reduction in nuclear weapons and will multilateral disarmament continue to be our aim?
	My right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) probably summed up my view almost word for word: with some unhappiness, it is yes to the decision tonight. However, I was especially struck by a point that he raised about dependence on the US. If we do not want to be entirely dependent on the US, we need our own nuclear deterrent under our own control.
	We have had a thoughtful and interesting debate. This is one of those times when I wish that the public were watching. We have heard heartfelt contributions on a subject that is at the centre of what we are all here for—the security of the United Kingdom and its citizens.

Jeremy Wright: It would be easy to convince ourselves in this debate that the world would be better off without nuclear weapons—we could all agree with that. We could also easily convince ourselves that we could do something more productive with £15 billion or £20 billion, but neither of those points are the issue. We have a responsibility not to decide the issue in a way that makes us feel better, but to make the decision that we think is best. I accept that that is difficult, because we are trying to develop a response to the security threats of the next 20, 30, 40 or even 50 years, which we cannot foresee. The point has been made that it is impossible to predict the world of the 2050s.
	Hon. Members who spoke against the motion said that the most important threat that we face is not a nuclear power; it is climate change or world terrorism. I am sure that they are right, but who, 30 or 40 years ago, would have predicted that those would be the primary threats? The answer is very few people indeed. We have to project forwards, and ask whether we hon. Members are making similarly inaccurate predictions. Our judgments are based on educated guesswork. In some cases, it is highly educated guesswork, but it is guesswork none the less. In those circumstances, I prefer to err on the side of caution. If we do not know what threats we face, surely we must do our utmost to be ready for everything.
	Even if the threats of today are those that we will face in the next 30 or 40 years, it is hard to argue that we face an increasingly safe world. It is quite the reverse. Some nations, which have already been mentioned, are developing nuclear capacity, so it is a spectacularly inappropriate time for Britain to be abandoning its nuclear deterrent. I do not accept the argument that that is not what we are discussing today; it is exactly what we are discussing. If we defer the decision, we may find that it is taken out of our hands. We cannot chose between keeping the deterrent and updating the deterrent; it is one and the same thing, because a deterrent that is out of date is no deterrent at all.
	I shall briefly deal with the main arguments against the motion. The first is that we set a bad example by renewing Trident and that we weaken our hand as regards non-proliferation. I do not accept that, and I do not believe that we are in breach of our non-proliferation obligations by renewing what we already have; that is not proliferation. I do not accept that we weaken the message that we send, or that we send the wrong message. The wrong message to send would be a refusal to renew Trident. At this moment in history, that would send precisely the wrong message—a message of weakness when we need to project strength. It would also be a message of complete irrelevance, because I do not believe for a second that if our country gave up what amounts to 1 per cent. of the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons, it would affect anyone's judgment in any way.
	Secondly, I do not accept that the decision is precipitate; this is the right time to make it. We should err on the side of caution. If we do not take the decision today, we could find that our manufacturing and expertise capacity has been diminished to the point where we cannot make another decision when we want to do so.
	I shall vote cautiously. I will not take chances with our national security, nor will I play political games with it. I shall vote for the Government's motion.

Alison Seabeck: Had I been asked to deliver this speech 35 years ago when I was a young, idealistic student, I would have taken a different view and given a different speech. There are a number of reasons why I have changed my position. My support for the new programme is not based simply on its economic benefits for the south-west defence-based industries, although understanding the complexity of the procurement process and the nature of their highly skilled work has informed my position.
	As we have heard in powerful speeches from colleagues in all parties, there are a number of key issues and questions. Do we need the deterrent? What is the threat now that the cold war is over? Are there legal arguments against the ongoing programme? They are good questions. Many colleagues pressed the point about where the future threat lies. Is there a threat? I do not know, but we cannot take risks. None of us is psychic. We do not know what the threat will be in 20, 25 or 50 years' time. We cannot work on the assumption that we will be able to get by on our stock of conventional weapons if a threat emerges at some future date. Leaving until later a decision on the go-ahead for submarines capable of launching the missiles—the decision is about giving the go-ahead for the submarine procurement process—could leave the UK facing an enemy with one arm tied behind its back.
	We cannot rely on diplomacy to get us out of any future confrontation. It would not be rational to do so. Relatively recent history shows that such an option could leave our nation exposed. In the 1920s, following the war to end all wars, disarmament was the preferred option, for reasons we all understand. However, military dictators stepped in to fill the vacuum, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Mr. Raynsford) described earlier, because certain western democracies were seen as vulnerable. Diplomacy failed us then, and we were not prepared. It took the Herculean efforts of armament workers in the UK who rushed to produce weapons, as well as the incredible bravery of our service personnel against enormous odds, particularly in the early years of the war, to get us to the point where victory was possible.
	Delaying the decision would be disastrous on defence grounds. Abandoning the programme may be a desirable outcome for many colleagues in this place and could be welcome in other quarters—probably foreign Governments who have no nuclear weapons and no desire to build them. However, there is no evidence to suggest that such a course of action would encourage others to follow our lead. I can see no way in which it would give states developing nuclear weapons—North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India or Israel—any reason to stop their programmes. Indeed, it could have the opposite effect.
	In Plymouth, a city associated with the armed forces and one of the cities most heavily bombed during world war two, we understand the deterrence process. Equally, we understand the importance of the SSBN—ship submersible ballistic nuclear—programme to the economy of our city and the wider south-west, as well as to the UK's maritime industrial base. My colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy), has already made that case well. I can but reiterate the point that the importance of a decision to continue with Trident—on what is generally seen throughout the House as the most effective delivery platform for the missiles—cannot be understated.
	What we have in Plymouth is unique and what the defence industry requires is also unique. Admittedly, our skills could be used in other fields, but only the Ministry of Defence buys submarines and wants maintenance programmes for them. In Plymouth, we have the skills. Submarines cannot be conjured out of thin air if the strategic position changes at a future date. They cannot be built in the same way that fighter planes were rushed out in the second world war.
	No one can feel comfortable in a world where nuclear weapons exist, but we do not live in a secure world environment. Twenty years down the line, I certainly do not want to have to explain to a population threatened by a state with nuclear weapons that we do not have the capability to respond.

Bernard Jenkin: The question before the House is very simple. We are being asked whether we want the Government to proceed with the preparation of the continuation of our nuclear deterrent in some years' time or not. Any amendment or rejection of the motion will mean that the House has instructed the Government not to continue with the concept, work and preparation of the submarines.
	A lot of this debate has turned on the question of the timing and the Select Committee, of which I am a member, looked at the issue carefully. Professor Garwood has been mentioned, among others, as someone advocating the idea that we had space for delay. The Committee considered this and other evidence and not a single member was convinced.
	The misunderstanding arises from the different ways in which the two respective powers—Britain and the US—use the submarines. We simply have four submarines; at any time, we have one at sea, one in refit, one going to operations and one spare. That is the way in which we operate. The Americans have a very large number of submarines. We took evidence from Rear Admiral Andrew Mathews, who is director general, nuclear. He made it perfectly clear that we operate in a different way. The lifetime of the submarines is shortened because we use them more intensively and rely upon using them more intensively. To get, as he put it, one from four is much more difficult than two or three from 14, which is what the American's do.
	Moreover, we can extend the life of the submarines to 25 or 30 years, but their reliability declines over the period. Because the Americans have that spare capacity in their much greater build, they can afford that redundancy and unreliability. We cannot, if we are to maintain our deterrent. That is why the decision needs to be taken today.
	My only other comment is about the strategic context. The hon. Member for North Devon (Nick Harvey) said that the world was watching us today. The one way of making sure that the world will watch us no longer and give us no influence is to wantonly throw away the influence we have. By wantonly throwing away possession of our nuclear weapons, we will give something for nothing. I commend the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, North (Mr. Henderson) who dealt with the proliferation point extremely well. If we throw away our weapons, the world will watch us no more and will take no interest in anything that our Government have to say.

Katy Clark: It is with great pleasure that I say that I—along with, I suspect, several other Scottish Labour MPs—will vote against Trident's replacement this evening. I would vote against Trident's replacement wherever in the United Kingdom it was based, but the reality is that it is based in the west of Scotland and for many decades vast majorities of people in Scotland have made it clear that they oppose nuclear weapons being based in Scotland. I think that that is because they, perhaps more than people in any other part of Britain, are very aware of what those weapons represent. They are weapons of mass destruction that have been designed to target civilian communities and to maximise death and suffering.
	We know what the outcome of the use of a nuclear weapon is; we learned that in Hiroshima. The only country in the world that has ever used nuclear weapons is the United States of America. I believe that the primary function of this debate should be to encourage us to do everything we can to make sure that such weapons are never used again. One of the most important things that we must do to make sure that they are never used again is to make sure that as few of them as possible exist in the world and that as few countries as possible have them.
	If today we vote for Trident renewal, that must be a breach of the non-proliferation treaty. We are talking about having 17 years of development of a new nuclear weapon system at, we understand, a cost of more than £20 billion. That is to develop a new and more sophisticated form of weapons of mass destruction. That is a very serious matter for this House to agree to. If we decide to go ahead with Trident renewal today, we will send the wrong signal to those countries that currently do not have nuclear weapons. What we will be saying to them is that a country such as Britain, which is stable and powerful and the fourth richest country in the world, needs nuclear weapons for our defence. If we need them, we must agree that other countries might also need them.
	I welcome the fact that we are having this debate. This is the first time that the Members of the House of Commons have had the opportunity to take part in a debate before such a decision is taken. The Government should be congratulated on that. It is partly because of the strength of feeling on the Labour Benches—

Des Browne: I am also grateful for the support, among others, of the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague), the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and the hon. Member for Salisbury (Robert Key). I welcome the contributions of my hon. Friends the Members for Lewisham, Deptford (Joan Ruddock), for Edinburgh, South (Nigel Griffiths) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), and, indeed, of the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram). The nature of their contributions gives the lie to the accusation that we have sometimes heard—that Members have not had the time or been given the information to form their views and engage in a full and proper debate. I believe that we have seen that debate today.
	From what I have seen and heard today and over the last three months, it is clear that opposition to the plans set out in the White Paper falls into three broad camps. First, there are those who believe that nuclear weapons are inherently wrong. Secondly, there are those who do not believe that they are inherently wrong, but believe that there is no longer any need for them because the world has changed. Thirdly, there are those who, regardless of what they think about the morality or the strategic case, think that we do not need to take the decision now.
	Let me start with the last. For some, the argument that we do not need to decide today is based on technical concerns such as whether the current submarines must go out of service when we say, or whether it really takes 17 years to build new ones. In the limited time available to me today, it would be pointless to try to set out the full range of reasons why I believe that those assertions are wrong; they are in the White Paper, and can be found in the evidence given to the Select Committee. I can say only that I am confident, and the Navy is confident, that they are wrong.
	I can also say that back in December when the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) told me that he had received different advice, I said that I would like to see it. Indeed, I was anxious to see it, because if we really were wrong I would have welcomed it. However, I have not heard back. Nor have I heard anything else over the last three months that goes beyond mere assertion, or false comparisons with other types of submarines or previous procurement processes. I have heard nothing to alter my belief that trying to extend the current boats any further, or to squeeze the build time any shorter, would be taking an unacceptable risk.
	I must also say that I believe it to be fundamentally wrong to hide behind such an argument about timing if what really motivates someone is opposition to the decision itself. It is an abdication of our responsibility as democratic representatives charged with the job of facing these decisions with clarity and honesty. I am not suggesting that all the reservations that we have heard about timing are disingenuous. Some Members have registered a more serious and genuine concern. I am thinking of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test (Dr. Whitehead) and supported, among others, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham). They have made it clear that they accept the Government's case and that we need to take a decision now, but argue that we should see it as a provisional or conditional decision, and make it clear that we intend to revisit it further down the line.
	Our position was set out earlier today by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when he said, "It is absolutely right that this Parliament cannot bind the decisions of a future Parliament and it is always open to us to come back and look at these issues...when we get to the gateway stage—between 2012 and 2014—when we let the main contracts...it will always be open to Parliament to take a decision." This happened when the previous generation of submarines was built, and it would be surprising if it did not happen again. However, the precise details of how future Parliaments should approach this issue is something that they must decide.
	As the Prime Minister went on to say, the fundamental point is that we need to take a decision now to start the process, and we have deliberately chosen to bring this decision to Parliament at the right time at the start rather than proceeding in secret and then presenting it later as a foregone conclusion. The hon. Member for North Devon is absolutely right when he says that we are asking the House not just to keep our options open but to take the big decision—the decision in principle.
	Let me turn briefly to the second camp, who believe that there is no longer any need for nuclear weapons because the world has changed. The world has changed, but a proper understanding of that change suggests that, although right now there is no nuclear threat and no country with both the capability and the intent to threaten us, which is why we have de-targeted our missiles, we cannot rule out the possibility that the threat will re-emerge. Indeed, recent events reinforce our view that this is not just a mere possibility but a very real risk. We should remember that other countries' intentions can change faster than we could possibly rebuild our deterrent if we allowed it to lapse.
	Finally, I come to the first camp, whose objections are essentially moral. I will not say much about this other than to echo what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said in opening the debate. We in this country and in the Government can be proud of our moral record on disarmament. We remain absolutely committed to it and we believe that it is completely compatible with the decision that we are asking Parliament to approve today. I know that that will not have persuaded everyone. The view that maintaining our nuclear deterrent is morally wrong, or morally or practically incompatible with working towards disarmament, is a position I respect, but one that I profoundly disagree with.
	It would be wrong not to acknowledge again the support of the official Opposition. The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks asked several detailed questions about costs and other matters, and he also said that they were questions for the future. I hope that he will be satisfied if I say that I will write to him. Given the limited time I had today, I wanted to spend it on the key arguments and factors in the decision that the House is about to make.
	I should not finish, however, without also acknowledging the contribution of the hon. Member for North Devon. I do not think that he actually finished his speech, given that he covered only two of the five points that he promised. I was particularly disappointed not to hear, finally, an explanation of why the Liberal Democrats settled on 100 as the right number of warheads—other than, of course, the fact that it is a round number. However, I think that I can summarise what he said. His party now accepts that the Government are now entirely right to make the decision and right to make it now, but that there was no need to tell anyone about it. Instead, we should just have carried on in secret without any public scrutiny and only come to Parliament some years down the line—

Andrew Pelling: That is an extremely good point. The approach of many ESOL providers is to be based in the communities that they are serving, and they could end up having as big a caseload as we all have in terms of dealing with benefits cases. Bearing in mind that perhaps more than 50 per cent. of people who might be eligible for benefits do not take them up, but are nevertheless having instruction from ESOL providers, a very significant amount of money that the Government are trying to save by placing a cap might well find its way back into the system as the increased benefits that will be provided.
	The Government clearly want to push a responsibility for provision on to employers. The recent LSC document said:
	"We will expect employers who actively recruit employees from outside the UK to bear the full cost of any necessary English language training."
	I am suspicious, however, that it will not be possible to provide the provision, despite the Government's desire to put in place new, short, work-related qualifications. Those qualifications will not give the thorough grounding that many ESOL clients seek.
	Perhaps there will be ways of improving efficiency. I have been interested to hear what the hon. Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey (Derek Wyatt) has said about the likely benefits of online learning. That has been the style within learndirect. Many people, however, want to learn within a community of learners. I was extremely impressed when I attended a recent awards presentation at Croydon college, which is doing very well these days. I saw someone there who had come to this country from Africa speaking no English. They had enjoyed the benefits of an ESOL course and, within a short time, are going on to higher education at Goldsmith's college.
	Concessions have been made by the Minister, but it is difficult to judge who will benefit from them. A national survey conducted through the Continuing Education and Training Service—CETS—has shown that only 16 per cent. of students felt able to afford the increased fees. I was also impressed by a more recent survey conducted by colleges in south London, to which there was a significant level of response—it received 2,615 replies. It showed that 50 per cent. of ESOL clients in south London are not on benefits. They are low paid, but do not want to claim benefits. Unfortunately, however, if they were required to pay significant fees, many of them would be unlikely to continue with the scheme. Eighteen per cent. of the respondents said that they were unable to pay the proposed increases, and 23 per cent. said that they were not sure whether they could pay. While it is important not to exaggerate, the potential exists for up to 41 per cent. of south London ESOL clients no longer to take the courses. I am also grateful for the briefing that I received from the principal of the Mary Ward centre, where 45 per cent. of students earning less than £15,000 a year are not claiming benefit.
	I should like to conclude by citing a case study, to avoid the danger of dealing only with the dry nature of the changes in provision. I want to cite the case of a married lady from Burma who learned English for four years, progressing from beginners level at community classes to advanced, intensive courses at Thornton Heath CETS centre in the London borough of Croydon. She joined a child care training course with English language support, then gained part-time and, subsequently, full-time work in a crèche. Unfortunately, that lady is now widowed, but she is able to support herself and her children and to contribute to society. The real question is whether the concessions will be able to deliver for people like her.
	I know that there is a real problem with constraining the budget, and that the Minister is doing his very best to accommodate that approach, but I am not convinced that hacking away at the budget in this way is going to work. I am grateful that so many Members have stayed behind tonight to take part in the debate. That suggests that my concerns are widely shared. Despite the various attempts, many of the proposed concessions might further complicate the issue.
	I shall now be a Conservative and propose a way to solve the budgetary problem. If we believe that many of the people involved will be able to secure long-term work, perhaps they could pay back their fees at a later date, when they can afford to do so. It is my view that employers will not perceive it to be in their interests to pay for this provision at this time.

Bill Rammell: Let me be clear: the basic skills weighting has not been removed for ESOL. Last year, however, we committed ourselves to extending learner choice and providing suitable qualifications for those studying English mainly for work. Such courses will be shorter for people who do not have basic skills needs but who do need to improve their English. The new qualifications will be eligible for public funding, but with a funding rate of one: they will not have the enhanced weighting. To be clear, that applies to new business, not to existing provision. I hope that that provides reassurance.
	To return to how we approached the situation, we could have simply capped the ESOL budget, but that would have done nothing to reprioritise funding towards those who were always at the back of the queue in relation to learning opportunities and improving their life chances. We have made the right choice in refocusing funding on those who most need public help and support, and on those who have little chance of improving their skills without free language learning. To help those who find it difficult to get a job or are stuck in low-income work due to poor English, individuals eligible for jobseeker's allowance or in receipt of income-related benefits will continue to access free ESOL through standard LSC provision. We expect at least 50 per cent. of those who are currently eligible for free ESOL to be in that category. Some of the criticism—which has not been heard this evening—of our proposals has completely misrepresented that issue. There will still be significant support and provision of free ESOL for those who need it.
	There will be other beneficial changes. From April, Jobcentre Plus staff will help jobseekers agree on steps to overcome language difficulties. Moreover, 15,000 places are now available for Jobcentre Plus customers on new target provision from the Learning and Skills Council. As I said earlier, the purpose of the changes has not been to make significant savings from the ESOL budget, and I expect the overall amount available next year to remain broadly comparable with the amount available this year. This is not a cuts-driven agenda. However, it is clear that not all ESOL learners need the same levels of public support or provision.
	That is why, in partnership with the LSC, we are proposing what I consider to be sensible and fair changes to ESOL provision from August this year. We expect those who can afford it to make a contribution to the cost of provision, and I think we are right to do so. When people are asked to make a contribution to the cost of learning, the state will continue to pick up the majority of costs—at least 62.5 per cent. in most cases. In some cases, because of additional allowances, learner contributions will be as low as 19 per cent. of the course costs.
	We are also enhancing the choice available to those learning English who may not need the full package of support offered by Skills for Life ESOL courses by developing a suite of new qualifications focused on the needs of those who need English for work. That is an important step, and it is what many people desire and need.
	Migrant workers make a significant economic and cultural contribution to the country, and we recognise their need to learn English, but in the context of free ESOL provision it is critical for us to address the skills need of priority learners first. We must press employers to make a greater financial contribution: after all, investment in ESOL provision if their work force requires it is an investment in the future success of their business. Along with the LSC, trade unions and employer organisations, we are already urging more employers to take on that responsibility for their workers.
	We are also making changes for asylum seekers. Across Government, we are taking a more consistent and effective approach to support for them. We have significantly reduced waiting times for initial decisions, 76 per cent. of which are now made within eight weeks. The Home Office's target for appeals is six months, and we expect the introduction of its new asylum model later this year to reduce waiting times even further. Taking account of that, and of the fact that 70 per cent. of all applications for asylum fail, we think it right to review free provision of ESOL services for that group.
	It is not fair to use public money to support people who, in the long term, will not have a chance to work and settle in this country; nor is it appropriate to potentially mislead them by offering support through ESOL provision when a decision about their future has not been made. For those reasons asylum seekers aged 19 and over will no longer have automatic access to free ESOL, although refugees will continue to have free access when they are on low incomes or fall within one of our other priority learner groups. I think that, in that respect, most people will consider the changes reasonable.
	In making our decisions, we have listened to the views and concerns of all involved in the debate. We have rightly conducted a race equality impact assessment before introducing the changes. We have held focus group sessions and interviews with more than 150 learners, providers and other key figures in the ESOL delivery and learning chain. I have met members of the Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration, the Refugee Council, trade unions, the Children's Society and Members of Parliament. I have gone out of my way to listen to their concerns, and I believe that that was the right thing to do.
	To those who have listened to learners' stories, it has become clear that we need to do more to assist asylum seekers who are here legally and whose cases take much longer than Home Office targets, or who remain in the United Kingdom owing to circumstances beyond their control. We need to do more to support spouses who do not have access to funding or to family benefit documents. We also need to help workers who are on very low wages and not receiving working tax credit. With the genuine aim of overcoming those problems, I am minded to make the following changes to our proposals. I hope to announce the details very shortly. First—this should be compared with the proposed changes I announced last October—we are minded to propose to reinstate eligibility after six months for all those who are in this country legally awaiting a decision on their asylum claim or appeal, and for those who despite being refused asylum in the UK cannot leave because of circumstances beyond their control and who are eligible for support under section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. That is an important change.
	Secondly, we propose to reprioritise funds at a local level to help spouses who are priority learners in hard-to-reach groups and are unlikely to have access to their own money or family benefit documentation. To respond to the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris), let me say that I believe that these changes can, and will, work, and I shall make clear when I publish the guidance on this matter how we intend to achieve our goals in the near future.
	Thirdly, we propose to ensure that those asylum seekers who go on an ESOL waiting list before their 19th birthday will still get free access, even if the place is not available until after their 19th birthday. That is an issue that the Refugee Council pressed me on in particular, and I am happy to provide some reassurance on it.
	Fourthly, I have also asked the Learning and Skills Council to develop guidance on a raft of options in respect of benefits that providers could accept as documentary evidence—such as housing benefit and other means-tested benefits—of entitlement to fee remission as well as the working tax credit. That intended change has rightly been widely welcomed. Moreover, I am seeking to work with Ministers in the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Home Office to discuss and secure a more coherent approach to ESOL across Government. I am also committed to work even more closely with trade unions, the CBI and the sector skills councils to review how we can best encourage and support employers contributing to the cost of ESOL provision for their workers. The intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Mr. Khan) was right; we need to do more in that regard. There is a real responsibility on employers, and we should make that very clear.
	These additional measures will address many of the issues raised in the race equality impact assessment. The complete assessment will be published shortly, and will include a detailed response on how we, in partnership with the LSC, plan to address these changes and all other report findings.
	The current arrangements for ESOL are not sustainable. We will continue to work with learners, providers, employers and other individuals and agencies involved in ESOL to ensure that we develop the best possible provision for those who need it most. The status quo is not an option. What we are proposing is, I believe, the best way forward.
	I genuinely respect the integrity of the concerns expressed this evening. I honestly believe that our intended modifications will move us in the right direction and provide some solutions to the situation prevailing in some parts of the country where the poorest learners are excluded from the system. We cannot allow that situation to continue, which is why we have produced these proposed changes.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Adjourned accordingly at three minutes past Eight o'clock.